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Universal Human Rights in the Law of the
United Statest
This Article discusses the relationshipin U.S. law between State,
Federal,and internationalauthoritieson universal human rights. All
U.S. State constitutions and the Federal Constitution recognize the
"inherent"or "inalienable"rights of humanity. Yet despite having long
accepted the binding force of universal human rights, U.S. courts and
public officials have been hesitant to recognize non-U.S. authorities
when identifying, interpreting, or enforcing these rights in practice.
The U.S. government and courts view most internationaltreaties and
declarations concerning universal human rights as simple restatements of existing constitutional guarantees. U.S. courts and public
officials have generally weighed foreign evidence of the requirements
of universal human rights according to the legitimacy, importance,
and probative value of the source. The undemocratic and illiberal nature of many internationalinstitutions makes it unlikely that the U.S.
Federal or State legal systems will cede final control over such questions to non-U.S. or multinational authoritiesat any time in the near
future.
The founding legal principles and separate political existence of
the United States of America began with the claim that "all men" are
born with certain "unalienable rights," including rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."'The United States' Declaration of
Independence from Great Britain rested on this assertion that
human rights are universal and binding on all human beings, nations, and states and that it is only to secure these rights that
governments legitimately exist, so "that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the
people to alter or to abolish it."2 The political architects of the United
States believed that by violating fundamental human rights, the
* M.N.S. Sellers is Regents Professor of the University System of Maryland,
Director of the University of Baltimore Center for International and Comparative
Law, and Visiting Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center.
t DOI 10.5131/ajcl.2009.0040.
1. THE UNANIMOUS
(July 4, 1776).

DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2. Id.
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British king had made himself a "tyrant... unfit to be the ruler of a
free people," and therefore subject to replacement by a "new govern3
ment" more suited to the "safety and happiness" of its citizens.
Universal human rights are, will be, and always have been deeply
embedded in the law of the United States, and binding in all American tribunals of justice.
There was not at the beginning, is not now, and never can be for
Americans any question whether human rights are universal and
binding, because universal human rights supply the theoretical foundations that support the U.S. Federal and separate State
governments and necessarily provide, in the American view, the ultimate basis of all legitimate government anywhere. 4 John Adams, the
leading constitutional lawyer of the American Revolution, took it for
granted as early as 1765 that "many of our rights are inherent and
essential, agreed on as maxims, and established as preliminaries,
even before a parliament existed." 5 When the North American States
established their own independent governments, most followed Adams' advice by supporting their new written constitutions with
detailed declarations of rights, listing some of the "inherent rights,"
of which no government or state can presume to "deprive" or "divest"
6
its subjects.
These declarations of the newly independent American States
were no innovation. They followed the example of such famous documents as the Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges of 1701 or the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, 7 and would be replicated on
a larger scale by the French Declarationdes droits de l'Homme et du
citoyen of 1789, the United States Bill of Rights of 1791, and finally
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948.8
3. Id.
4. On American conceptions of rights in the era of independence, see SHAIN,
BARRY A. (ED.), THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND
(2007); BREEN, T.H., THE LOcKEAN MOMENT: THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS ON THE EVE OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2001); Reid, John P., CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986); ADAMS, WILLI PAUL, THE
FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA, trans. Rita Kimber and Robert
Kimber (1980); WHITE, MORTON G., THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

(1978); Hamburger, Philip A., Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907-960 (1993); Dana, William F., The Declaration of
Independence as Justificationfor Revolution, 13 HARV. L. REV. 319-343 (1900).
5. ADAMS, JOHN, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1765) in ADAMS, CHARLES FRANCIS (ed.) THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, volume 111 (1865) at p. 463.
6. These quotations are from the Virginia Declarationof Rights (June 12, 1776).

7. On these and other antecedents of the American declarations of rights, see

SCHWARTZ, BERNARD, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BILL OF RIGHTS (expanded ed. 1992).
8. For a collection of such texts, see FREDERIK MARl, BARON VAN ASBECK, ED., THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS PREDECESSORS (1679-1948),
(1949). Cf. MORSiNK, JOHANNES, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT (1999).
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The Universal Declaration, like the American declarations,
threatened "rebellion against tyranny and oppression" unless human
rights were "protected by the rule of law"9 and insisted that "all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."'1 So
intimate is the relationship between universal human rights and the
rights protected by the U.S. Constitution, that in the eyes of the U.S.
government and courts most international covenants and treaties
recognizing universal human rights are simply restatements of existing U.S. law and established constitutional guarantees." To the
extent that international documents and scholarly or other interpretations of universal human rights depart from traditional American
understandings of these ancient guarantees, American officials have
usually preferred their own longstanding precedents to more recent
12
(and less well-established) interpretations of human rights law.
This last point is particularly important in understanding the
role that universal human rights play in the legal systems of the
United States of America. While there is no question that human
rights are universal and binding throughout the United States, there
have been strong and persistent disagreements about who has the
authority to prescribe or to identify these rights in detail, to enforce
their requirements against violations in practice, and to adjudicate
legal disputes that arise from their enforcement. There are international, Federal (U.S.), and State constitutions and declarations
purporting to identify and to protect universal human rights, and international, Federal (U.S.) and State authorities with simultaneous
and often overlapping responsibility to implement and protect the
fundamental rights of the people. This discussion will consider State,
Federal, and international documents and authorities in the order in
which they first asserted their jurisdiction through courts, beginning
with the separate State institutions.
I.

HUMAN

RIGHTS IN THE STATES

The United States of America forms a Union of otherwise independent States, which have delegated certain powers to a Federal
9. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (December 10, 1948),

Preamble.
10. Id. Article 1.
11. See, e.g., Message of President

Jimmy Carter to the United States Senate,
February 23, 1978 (concerning the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, signed on behalf of the United States on September
28, 1966; THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS, signed on behalf of the United States on October 5, 1977; THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CrVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, signed on behalf of the United States on
October 5, 1977; and the AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, signed on behalf

of the United States on June 1, 1977).
12. See, e.g., id. and U.S. reservations,declarations,and understandings,International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 138 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S4781-01
(daily ed. April 2, 1992).
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government, but reserve the rest. 13 Each of the States has its own
constitution, and each of the State constitutions has its own bill or
declaration of rights. 14 The constitutions of five of the most influenof these
tial States can be taken here as useful and typical 1examples
16
5
various State provisions. Thus, the Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia,' 7 Texas, 18 and California' 9 constitutions all contain their
own lists of fundamental rights, which are to be protected by courts
and public officials (who must take an oath to do so).2o The State constitutions describe these rights as "natural, essential, and
unalienable" (Massachusetts),21 the "inherent rights of mankind"
(Pennsylvania),2 2 "inherent rights, of which... they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity" (Virginia),2 3 because "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights" (California), 24 which must be maintained by their "free and
independent State[s], subject only to the Constitution of the United
25
States, and the maintenance of our free institutions" (Texas).
The bills and declarations of rights of the existing American
States served as the model for the U.S. Bill of Rights, which was added to the Constitution by amendment, as a condition of that
document's ratification. 2 6 Many feared that under the new constitution, the U.S. government might "deprive them of the liberty for
13. This point is clarified in the United States Constitution by Amendment X,
ratified on December 15, 1791.
14. These may be found easily on-line through the various State websites.

15.

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

Part the First, A

Declarationof the Rights of the Inhabitantsof Massachusetts.
16. CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Article 1, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

17. CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, Article 1, BILL OF RIGHTS.
18. THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION, Article 1, BILL OF RIGHTS.
19. CONSTITUTION OF CALIFORNIA,

Article 1,

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

20. For example, in California all members of the legislature, and all public officials and employees, executive, legislative, and judicial, except such inferior officers
and employees as may be by law exempted, must "before they enter upon the duties of
their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation." The
oath reads: "I, __, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to
enter." CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Article 20. California public officials must further swear or affirm that they belong to no party or organization that
advocates the overthrow of the government by force or violence.
21. CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Article CVI.
22. CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Article 1, Section 1.
23. CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, Article I, Section 1.
24. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, Article 1, Section 1.
25. THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION, Article 1, Section 1.

26. Preamble of the "Bill of Rights," as proposed by the U.S. Congress to the
States (March 4, 1789).

2010]

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS

537

which they valiantly fought and honorably bled"2 7 and wanted the
same protections at the Federal level of "those safeguards which they
have long been accustomed to have interposed between them and the
magistrate who exercises the sovereign power. ' 28 James Madison,
who proposed the U.S. Bill of Rights to Congress, cited possible
threats to liberty not only from the Federal executive and legislature,
but also from the people of the United 29States themselves, "operating
by the majority against the minority."
The hope expressed for the Federal, as for the State bills of
rights, was that the "independent tribunals of justice" would consider
themselves to be "the guardians of those rights"30 and an "impenetra31
ble bulwark" against every improper "encroachment upon rights"
enumerated in the "declaration of the rights" of the people. 32 The
most persuasive argument offered against the Federal Bill of Rights
was that such lists of rights, however carefully drafted, might seem to
"disparage" those rights not explicitly set down, 33 James Madison
averted this danger by proposing what became the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people. '34 The citizens of the
United States were united from the beginning in seeking to "fortify
the rights of the people against the encroachments of the
35
Government."
The relationship between the duty of the separate State governments to protect the natural and inherent rights of the people, and
the duty of the Federal government to do the same was highly contested at first. The famous Kentucky 3 6 and Virginia Resolutions of
179837 denied both that the protection of fundamental rights in the
States was the province of the Federal government 38 and that the
U.S. government should be the final arbiter of its own jurisdiction in
27. James Madison discussed this viewpoint in his speech to the Congress proposing a Bill of Rights. THE ANNALS OF CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FIRST
CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (June 8, 1789), p. 449.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 456.
On the Ninth Amendment see

FARBER, DANIEL A., RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE
PRINCE, CHARLES 0., THE PURPOSE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2005); BARNETT, RANDY, RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (1991).
35. James Madison in THE ANNALS OF CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FIRST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION (June 8, 1789) p. 459.
36. RESOLUTIONS OF THE KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE (November 10, 1798).
37. RESOLUTION OF THE VIRGINIA SENATE (December 24, 1798).
38. RESOLUTIONS OF THE KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE (November 10, 1798) no.3.

(2007);
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these or any other circumstances. 39 Kentucky claimed the right to
"nullify" any Federal Acts that overstepped the proper limits of Federal control, 40 insisting that "it is jealousy, and not confidence which
prescribes limited constitutions." 4 1 Both State and the Federal authorities claimed to protect fundamental rights and justice, without
being certain at first which jurisdiction had ultimate control.
Chief Justice John Marshall concluded in the famous case of Barron v. City of Baltimore (1833) that the "liberty of the citizen" was 4a2
subject on which the States remained the judges "exclusively"
under the U.S. Constitution. Marshall suggested that the purpose of
listing fundamental rights in the Federal Constitution was solely to
constrain the U.S. government, while the State courts, constitutions,
and legislature had primary responsibility for keeping their own governments in check. 43 This did not mean that the fundamental and
inherent rights of all persons did not apply against the State governments, but rather that the U.S. courts were not responsible for their
enforcement against the States' own public officials. 44 The "fundamental" guarantees, "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments," have been enjoyed by the citizens of the American
States "from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign,"4 5 and generally protected by the State courts. 46 The famous
Federal cases of Calder v. Bull (1788) and Corfield v. Coryell (1823)
confirmed that State governments have a duty to respect "that security for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof
those rights
government was established" (Calder)47 and to uphold
48
which are "in their nature, fundamental" (Corfield).
The United States discovered in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries what has become apparent to the world since the Second
World War, which is that local ("national" or "sovereign") enforcement of the "great rights of mankind" fails in the face of petty
prejudice and the parochial self-interest of local ethnic, religious, and
political factions. 4 9 For example, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
39. Id., Resolution no. 1.

40. Id., Resolution no. 8.
41. Id.
42. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 248 (1833).
43. Id. at 250-1.
44. The Constitution itself referred to the "privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states," CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1787), Article IV, section
2.
45. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, no. 3230 C.C.E.D. Pa. (1823).

46. See Calder v. Bull, 3. U.S. 386, 388 (1798) for those acts "which the Federal, or
State, Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority."
47. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
48. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, no. 3230 C.C.E.D. Pa. (1823).
49. James Madison saw this already when he proposed the Bill of Rights to the
First Congress and observed that he thought "there is more danger of those powers
being abused by the State Governments than by the Government of the United
States." James Madison, in THE ANNALS OF CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
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held in the case of Amy, a woman of color, v. Smith (1822) that "free
negroes and mulattoes" are a "degraded race of people"50 and therefore not entitled to any of those "ordinary rights of personal security
and property" enjoyed by others in the Commonwealth. 5 1 The same
was true in Tennessee, which considered any "man of color" to belong
to an "inferior caste in society" and "scarcely" worthy of enjoying "a
'5 2 All
single right in common with the mass of citizens of the State.
this in spite of constitutional clauses in their State bills or declarations of rights, which guaranteed that "no free man shall be . . .
deprived of his life, liberty of property, but by .. . the law of the
53
land."

The disregard by the southern States in the American Union of
the universal or "inherent" rights of humanity, as applied not only to
their slaves, but also to free African Americans, led to increasingly
sharp conflicts with other States and their representatives in the
U.S. legislature, and in the courts. 5 4 U.S. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney tried to settle the question, and to strengthen the slaveholders'
position, by extending the reasoning of the Amy and Claibornecases
to the United States as a whole in the infamous decision of Dred Scott
v. Sandford (1857), 5 5 in which Taney argued that the "self-evident"
truths of the Declaration of Independence, although they "would
seem to embrace the whole human family," were never intended to
56
extend to the "African Race."
The promotion of such reasoning, and principled resistance
against it, let in time to a great Civil War (1861 - 1865), and ultimately to the passage of three new amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, prohibiting slavery (Amendment XIII),5 7 extending the
vote to African Americans (Amendment XV),58 and prohibiting the

States from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law" or denying "any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws" (Amendment XIV). 59 These provisions
(June 8, 1789), p. 458. For "the great rights of mankind," see page 449.
50. Amy, a woman of color, v. Smith, 11 Ky. 326; 1 Litt. 326, 334.
51. Id. at 333.
52. The State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. 331, 1 Meigs 331, 340. "An emancipated
slave is called a freeman in common parlance ... but in reference to the conditions of
a white citizen, his condition is still that of degraded man, aspiring to no equality of
rights with white men, and possessing a very few only of the privileges pertaining to a
'freeman"'. Id. at 341.
53. State of Tennessee, CONSTITUTION OF 1835, Article I, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
section VIII. Cf Magna Carta, chapter 39.
54. For the vast literature on the antebellum conflict over fundamental human
rights, see BARNETT, RANDY, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
56. Id. at 410.
57. The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified on December 6, 1865.
58. The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified on February 3, 1870.
59. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868.
FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
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had the effect of overturning Dred Scott v. Sandford, which had protected legal discrimination against African Americans, but also
reversed Barron v. Baltimore, because the Fourteenth Amendment
gave the U.S. Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the
amendment "by appropriate legislation." 60
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution did not
limit or in any way compromise the separate duty of the governments
and courts in each of the States to protect and respect the universal,
inherent, and inalienable rights of humanity, as recognized by the
Declaration of Independence and in the various State constitutions
and bills of rights. 6 1 States continue to apply their own bills and declarations of rights directly, through their own courts. 62 But the
imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment gave the Federal government and courts full power to intervene when states invade or fail to
protect the "life, liberty, or property" of any person subject to their
jurisdiction. State governments and courts can and often do protect
rights (including universal rights) more broadly and generously than
has yet been required by U.S. courts, but they cannot now diminish
the rights of their citizens by narrow or parochial constructions of
63
universal human rights.
II.

FEDERAL PROTECTIONS OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS

The U.S. government did not at first fully exercise the powers
conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 4 and even when the
United States did act, such action was not at first supported by the
courts, which were slow to accept the vastly expanded jurisdiction of
the Federal authorities. 65 U.S. courts recognized that some "additional guarantees of human rights" were provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment, along with "additional powers" for the Federal government, and the "additional restraints" upon the States 66 concerning
"fundamental rights" as described in the old case of Corfield v. Cory60. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 5.
61. See Brennan, William J. Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986);
Brennan, William J. Jr., State Constitutions and the Revival of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
62. See, e.g. Marshall, Margaret H., Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from
their Children:InterpretingState Constitutionsin an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79
N.Y.L. REV. 1633 (2004).
63. Linde, Hans A., E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA.
L. REV. 165 (1984); Linde, Hans A., First things First - Rediscovering the States' Bills
of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).
64. The first major attempt to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to protect Civil
Rights in the States was the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (also known as the "Enforcement
Act" or the "Ku Klux Klan Act") (17 STAT. 13).
65. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (18 STAT. 335) was struck down as
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883).
66. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67-68 (1873).
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ell.6 7 But the Court could not at first accept that the Federal

government should really have the power to enforce "the entire do68
main of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States."
The whole history of U.S. human rights law since the Supreme Court
first interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House
Cases in 1873 has been the story of gradual progress towards broader
acceptance by the Federal Courts and Congress that the Fourteenth
Amendment did indeed "radically change[] the whole theory of the
relations of the State and Federal governments to each other,"69 by
protecting "the rights of person and property" against the arbitrary
70
power of the States.
American judges disagreed initially, not about the existence of
"natural and inalienable" rights, 71 "which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments,"7 2 but about whether the Federal
73
Constitution protected these "common rights" against State action.
Gradually, over decades, Federal judges and other American public
officials came to accept that the Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable
rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not
confer, but only recognizes." 74 Put more prosaically, more than a century after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the Federal and other courts in the United States now
fully accept that "all fundamental rights comprised within the term
liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the
States" 75 through the section of the Fourteenth Amendment which
declares that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." The controlling word in most
'7 6
such cases is "liberty.
The protection of liberty "against executive usurpation," "tyranny," and "arbitrary legislation," 7 7 has been the business of
American courts from the beginning, often resting on the ancient
67. "Rights which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments" and "embrace nearly every civil right for the protection of which civil government is
instituted." Id. at 75-76. Cf. above on Corfield v. Coryell.
68. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77 (1873) at 77.
69. Id. at 78.
70. Id. at 82.
71. Id. (Field dissent), p. 96.
72. Id. (Field dissent), p. 97.
73. Id. (Field dissent), p. 89.
74. Id. (Field dissent), p. 105.
75. Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992) quoting Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 373 (1927).
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) at 846.
77. Id. at 847 quoting Justice Harlan, dissenting on jurisdictional grounds in Poe
v. Ullman 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961), in which Justice Harlan quoted the case of
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
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promise of the English Magna Carta that "No freeman shall be taken
or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed ... but by
the law of the land."7 8 This final phrase, "perlegem terrae," was understood by English Whigs and by the American constitutional
writers who followed them, to protect life, liberty, and property from
deprivation except through the "due process of law." 79 Some such protection and guarantee appears in most American State bills of rights,
in the U.S. Bill of Rights (Amendment V), and in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which requires that no State
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
The historical antecedents of the phrases "liberty" and "due process" in the Fourteenth Amendment have colored their interpretation
from the beginning. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its most detailed recent discussion of the meaning of the word "liberty" in the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, cited Magna Carta and
quoted the phrase "per legem terrae" as interpreted by Supreme
Court jurisprudence going back to the nineteenth century.8 0 The Supreme Court has construed this fundamental "liberty" to encompass
most of the rights enumerated in the U.S. Bill of Rights, 8 1 but also
other fundamental human rights, such as the rights to marry,8 2 to
procreate,8 3 to pursue an education,8 4 or to enjoy "privacy" as privacy
relates to abortion 8 5 and to homosexuality.8 6 To determine the scope
of such rights, U.S. courts have looked to the concepts of "personal
dignity" and "autonomy" that are "central to the liberty protected by
87
the Fourteenth Amendment."
The U.S. executive, congress, and the courts feel a responsibility
to strengthen and to advance the American legal tradition of "liberty,"8 8 "having regard to what history teaches are the traditions
78. MAGNA CARTA, 39 (1215).
79. See, e.g., Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S. 36,
50 (1873). Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 at 847 (1992).
80. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992), quoting Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961), which itself quoted
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
81. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-148 (1968).
82. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
83. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942).
84. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
86. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
87. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
88. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992), quoting Justice Harlan dissenting in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, at 542
(1961).
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from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke."8 9 This includes concern for judicial precedents in U.S. courts
protecting "personal autonomy," 90 but also the protection of other
rights implicit in the concept of ordered "liberty."9 1 A persistent but
isolated minority of judges on U.S. courts has sometimes seen the
concept of "tradition" as a limitation on "liberty" and fundamental
rights. 9 2 Such attitudes misunderstand the role of liberty in the
American legal tradition, which protects fundamental human rights,
not because they are "traditional," but because they are just-and
"unalienable" by any person or government official. 93 Tradition, precedent, and American legal history play a central role in clarifying
the meaning of liberty and universal human rights in U.S. courts, not
because American legal precedents create rights, but because the
American legal system and judges seeking to understand its promise
of liberty have studied individual human rights for so long, so care94
fully, and so well.

The role of American tradition in understanding the meaning of
"liberty" becomes particularly important when the U.S. Supreme
Court must overturn its own mistaken precedents concerning fundamental rights, as it did recently in the cases of Lawrence v. Texas
(2003) regarding homosexuality 95 and Roper v. Simmons (2005) regulating to the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 9 6 In both cases the
Court looked for support to decisions made by State courts interpreting their own bills or declarations of rights, 9 7 but also to the practices
of foreign and international tribunals interpreting universal rights as
applied to their own jurisdictions. 98 When the Supreme Court overturned its own recent precedents 99 to hold in Lawrence v. Texas that
homosexual adults must be left free to engage in "private conduct in
the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,"1 0 0 the rationale for this
holding depended on the Court's own evolving jurisprudence, 10 1 but
also on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,
89. Id.
90. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857, 860 (1992).
91. Id. at 869.
92. See, e.g., Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951-952, 981 (1992).
93. See, e.g., the United States Declaration of Independence (1776) on "unalien-

able rights" and the

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(1787) Preamble on

"Justice" and "the Blessings of Liberty."
94. See Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, at 848

(1992).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
Id. at 564-566.
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which had recognized similar protection of consensual homosexual
conduct under the European Convention on Human Rights. 10 2 The
Roper v. Simmons case invalidating the juvenile death penalty in the
United States cited the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
views
the Child (to which the United States is not a party) 10 3 and the
1 0°4
of "leading members of the Western European community.

Cases such as these, interpreting the fundamental requirements
of "liberty" under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, cite foreign opinions to establish
"civilized standards," 10 5 not because the opinion of the world community "controls" the outcome of American cases, 10 6 but because "the
express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations
and peoples . . . underscores the centrality of those same rights

within our own heritage of freedom."1 0 7 American judges interpreting
"values we share with a wider civilization"1 0 8 have been guided in
some cases by foreign jurisdictions towards better understanding
which rights (or which applications of known rights) should be protected "as an integral part of human freedom."1 0 9 This direct
reference by American courts to the fundamental and inalienable requirements of human liberty is often described (and sometimes
criticized) as establishing the "substantive" due process of law.' 1 0
The U.S. Constitution was intended by its drafters to constitute,
and accepted by the States that ratified it as having constituted, the
"supreme Law of the Land," not only in itself, but also through all
laws or treaties made under its provisions." 1 With the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the U.S. Supreme Court became
the final arbiter of all "fundamental rights" requiring judicial protection under the concept of "liberty" confirmed by the due process
clause of the U.S. Constitution.112 To understand which rights liberty
requires, judges and other officers of the State have looked to the U.S.
Bill of Rights,"1 3 to the practices of the American State governments
102. Id. at 573, citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) and
par. 52.

103. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003).
Id.
Justice Scalia dissenting in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003).

111.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

(1787) Article VI.

112. On the Fourteenth Amendment, see Epps,

GARRETT, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CVIL WAR
AMERICA (2006); NELSON, WILLIAM E., THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); CURTIS, MICHAEL KENT, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).

113. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
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and courts,'1 1 4 to the opinions of the broader world community, 1 5 and
directly to the "purpose and function" of liberty and rights in the "constitutional design." 1 16 This allows judicial and other public
liberty to
understandings of the rights protected by constitutional
"evolve" as society "progresses" and "matures."117
III.

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS STANDARDS

The U.S. Supreme Court puzzled some observers when it cited
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (a treaty
the United States never ratified)"18 and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (to which the United States had made a
specific reservation on this precise issue) 1 9 in concluding that the
imposition of the death penalty on juveniles under State law would
120
violate "liberty" rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such references by American courts to treaty provisions that are not
in themselves directly binding on the United States raises the
broader question how American courts, legislators, and government
officials apply generally accepted international human rights standards to American circumstances.' 2 1 American courts and American
public officials have usually weighed foreign evidence of the requirements of universal human rights according to the legitimacy,
importance, and probative value of the treaty, judicial decision, custom, or academic opinion advanced to substantiate the suggested
12 2
universal standard.
The use by American courts (and other public officials) of nonAmerican authorities to better understand fundamental rights protected by the U.S. Constitution reflects a broader American tradition
of looking beyond purely American precedents to clarify the requirements of international law.' 23 The most detailed exposition of this
American attitude was set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case
of The Paquete Habana in 1900, which negated the seizure of two
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id. at 576, 578.
116. Id. at 560.
117. Id. at 561.

118. Id. at 576.
119. Id.
120. See the florid dissent of Justice Scalia in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622

(2005) for his strongly worded objections to considering the views of such "like-minded
foreigners." Id. at 608.
121. Id.
122. Roper v. Simmons, the most prominent recent case to make such a judgment,
looks to the "express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples" to underscore "the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of
freedom." 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
123. For the early history, see JANIS, MARK W., THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS, 1789-1914 (2004).
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Cuban fishing boats as contrary to the law of nations. 124 To substantiate this "rule of international law" against the seizure of coastal
fishing vessels, even in time of war, the Supreme Court referred (inter alia) to the practices of English and French kings, 125 to treaties
among various European nations, 126 to French declarations, 27 to a
U.S. treaty with Prussia 28 and to Richard H. Dana's edition of Henry
Wheaton's treatise on the Elements of International Law. 129 The
Court suggested that taken together such authorities tend to indicate
a consensus among "civilized nations" concerning the requirements of
international law.1 30 The concept of what constitutes a "civilized nation" is to a large extent circular, but still plays a significant role in
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning fundamental human
rights.' 3 1 Foreign States that generally respect universal human
rights and the requirements of international law thereby show themselves to be "civilized," and their views and practices are taken as
human rights and international
good evidence of what fundamental
1 32
law require of them and others.
Courts (and others) in the United States have long recognized
that "International law is part of our law" and "must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction
as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented"
for determination. 1 3 3 But U.S. Federal and State courts will generally look to the controlling acts of Federal executive or legislative
authorities to determine the requirements of international law in
practice. 134 This reflects in part the natural deference of the judiciary
to legislative and executive authority, but also the positive grant to
Congress by the U.S. Constitution of the power "to define and punish
...offenses against the law of nations.' 3 5 This can lead to serious
tension, where congressional or executive conceptions of the requirements of international law are at variance with the more widely held
views or practices of other nations. But even in such cases, when they
concern universal human rights, the positive requirements of existing U.S. laws and the Constitution have usually been sufficient to
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 687-688.
Id. at 688-689.
Id. at 690-691.

129. Id. at 691.
130. Id. at 686.
131. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005), citing Thompson v.
Oklahoma 487 U.S. 815, 826 (1988).
132. The Supreme Court usually looks to "the Western European community" and
to "other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage." Id.
133. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).

134. Id.
135. UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION,

Article I, Section 8.
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maintain general compliance with widely accepted international
standards.

136

The most difficult question facing Americans and U.S. Courts in
seeking to implement universal human rights in practice has been to
determine which international institutions or foreign (or American)
authorities deserve deference (or at least consideration) in specific
cases. 137 For example, in the recent case of Medellin v. Texas, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded not only that the International Court
of Justice had no binding authority to order the review and reconsideration of Texas State court convictions and (ensuing death-penalty
sentences) as violations of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but also that the President of the United States had no authority
to require Texan compliance with what he judged to be the nation's
binding obligations under international law. 138 The underlying conflict arose from a difference of opinion between American and
Mexican public officials about the right to life as applied to the death
penalty, but this difference expressed itself in jurisdictional claims
relating to the proper domain and democratic legitimacy of the International Court of Justice. 139 The Supreme Court held in the Medellin
case both that the judgments of the International Court of Justice are
not directly enforceable as domestic law in the United States 140 and
that the President of the United States cannot order the States to
treat them as such 14 1 without first securing Federal implementing
to international obligalegislation to give separate domestic effect
14 2
tions already created by the treaty itself.
The Medellin case is particularly revealing, because the Supreme
Court stressed the significance of the United States' Security Council
43
veto in limiting the authority of the International Court of Justice. 1
The United States has not, and according to this rationale, should not
cede the same authority to the United Nations or to its organs that
the States ceded to the Federal government with the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 1 4 4 Certain in136. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557 (2006), which relied on Federal
law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to require the U.S. government to respect the humanitarian requirements of the Geneva Conventions.
137. See, e.g., "The Use of Foreign Law in American Constitutional Adjudication: A
Revealing Colloquy between Justices Scalia and Breyer" on the American University
website and discussed in Dorf, Michael G., No LITMUS TEST: LAW VERSUS POLITICS IN
THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY (Lanham, Maryland, 2006), pp. 213-219.
138. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
139. On American worries concerning the democratic legitimacy and general reliability of international courts, see Amann, Diane M. & Sellers, M.N.S., The United
States of America and the InternationalCriminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. (Supplement) 381 (2002).
140. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1357.
143. Id. at 1359.
144. Id. at 1360.
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ternational tribunals may enjoy a special status because of
implementing legislation enacted by Congress, but otherwise their
power is (and should be) limited. 14 5 Even the President of the United
States may not act in such cases, without prior Congressional legislation that empowers him to do so. 1 46 The pronounced aversion of U.S.
courts and public officials to ceding final control over the meaning or
interpretation of international law or human rights guarantees to
foreign authorities or to international tribunals might seem at first to
contradict the insight of the Fourteenth Amendment that local per147
ceptions of universal human rights are necessarily incomplete.
What makes the circumstance different (from the American perspective) is that international tribunals have not yet secured the judicial
autonomy or democratic legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme
Court or
148
other institutions of the U.S. Federal government.
U.S. attitudes towards the International Criminal Court provide
a striking recent example of American distrust of what some perceive
as the insufficiently liberal and democratic foundations of many international institutions. 1 4 9 The U.S. government refused to ratify the
Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) on
the theory (as it was expressed in the U.S. Senate) that ICC decisionmaking "will not be confined to those from democratic countries with
the rule of law." 150 The fear was that since each state party to the
ICC has one vote in the Assembly of States Parties, 15 1 this will make
the selection and removal of the prosecutor and judges, 15 2 the development of the rules of procedure and evidence, 153 and the alteration
of the treaty through amendment, 5 4 all ultimately subject to the in145. Id. at 1365-1366.
146. Id. at 1367-1368.
147. Id. at 1367. "Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate
intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a
higher status than that enjoyed by 'many of our most fundamental constitutional
protections'."
148. European Courts have showed a similar hesitancy to defer to less-than-democratic international institutions in cases affecting fundamental human rights, see the
joined cases of Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat InternationalFoundation v.
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities in the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P) (2008).
149. On American attitudes towards the International Criminal Court, see Amann
& Sellers, supra note 139.
150. "Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the National Interest?", Hearing
on the International Criminal Court before the International Operations Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (July 23, 1998) (statement of
Senator Rod Grams).
151. Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 183/9
(1998), art 112.
152. Id., Arts. 36(6)(a); 46(2)(a); 42(4); and 46(2)(b).
153. Id., Arts. 9(1) and 51(1).
154. Id., Arts. 121; 122.
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fluence of undemocratic and illiberal regimes. 15 5 As a general rule
the United States has been hesitant to cede judicial, legislative, or
enforcement authority to any international institution or tribunal
that is not subject (as in the United Nations) to the veto power of the
156
United States.
The confidence of Americans in their own constitutional protections of universal human rights has been so great that the United
States has joined in proposed international articulations or clarifications of universal human rights only with the greatest reluctance,
always taking care to maintain its own existing Federal constitutional understandings intact. 157 Whenever the United States has
taken the unusual step of ratifying an international treaty governing
or defining universal human rights, the motive has been to encourage
greater respect for fundamental rights in other nations, rather than
to change existing American constitutional guarantees.1 5 8 For example, when the United States ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, it was with express reservations preserving existing American conceptions of the right of free speech,1 59 the
right to life, 160 the prohibition of cruel or degrading treatment or
punishment, 161 the punishment of juvenile offenders, 16 2 and racial
and other discrimination, 63 as well as a general statement that
"Nothing in this covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other
action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitu1 64
tion of the United States as interpreted by the United States."
The United States ratified the United Nations conventions
against Torture, 16 5 against the Crime of Genocide, 166 and against All
155. See Amann & Sellers, supra note 139, at 389.

156. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) and particularly the remarks by
Chief Justice Roberts quoted supra, note 147.
157. See, e.g., Message of the President of the United States, Transmitting Four
Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. EXEC. Does. C, D, E and F, 95th Congress
2d. Session at III (February 23, 1978).
158. See, e.g., the statement of the American delegate Eleanor Roosevelt, On the
Adoption of the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly (December 9, 1948).
159. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S4781-01 (daily ed.,
April 2, 1992) at I(1).
160. Id. at I (2).
161. Id. at 1 (3).
162. Id. at 1 (5).
163. Id. at 11 (1).
164. Id. at IV.
165. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 101st
Congress, 2d session in 136 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S17486 (October 27, 1990).

166. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S1355-01

(February 19, 1986).
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Forms of Racial Discrimination, 167 but all with restrictive reservations, declarations, and understandings similar to those that applied
in the case of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These American reservations protect existing understandings of the U.S. Bill of
Rights, while also usually providing that rights treaties will in any
case be "non-self-executing," requiring that implementing legislation
must pass through the U.S. Congress before U.S. courts will apply
the provisions of international human rights conventions directly to
U.S. cases and controversies. 168 The general policy of the United
States with respect to all new multilateral human rights treaties has
been to view the great majority of their substantive provisions as consistent with the existing constitutions and laws of the United States,
but to the extent that the treaties are not consistent with existing
practice, to require a modifying reservation, understanding or declaration before giving the treaty legal effect in the Courts of the United
9
States. 16
IV.

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The courts and people of the United States have been committed
throughout their history to the proposition that human rights are
universal, binding, and enforceable by law-or even by extra-legal action and revolution when rights are not protected fully by the State.
Americans and American judges have also become accustomed
through their own history and in light of the American experience of
oppression, revolution, and civil war to cede jurisdiction over the protection of fundamental rights to inter-State institutions, such as the
U.S. Congress and the Federal judiciary. Americans demanded, when
they created their Federal Union, that the U.S. Constitution should
guarantee the same protections of inalienable human rights already
present in their own State constitutions, and they required in due
course that the United Nations Organization also declare its commitment to fundamental human rights 17 0 and to protect the "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
71
religion."'
The first U.S. delegate to the United Nations General Assembly,
Eleanor Roosevelt, played a leading role in securing the creation and
167. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Convention on the Prevention of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
S14326 (June 24, 1994).
168. See also Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting Four

Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. EXEC. Docs. C, D, E and F, 95th Congress
2d. Session at III (February 23, 1978).

169. Id.
170. CHARTER

OF THE UNITED NATIONS

171. Id., Art. 55.

(1945), Preamble.
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unanimous approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948.172 Speaking on behalf of the United States to the General
Assembly of the United Nations, Roosevelt embraced the Universal
Declaration as a "great event ...

in the life of mankind"

73

and ex-

pressed her nation's hope that "this Universal Declaration of Human
Rights may . . .become the International Magna Carta of all men

everywhere," a document as significant for all humanity as the Bill of
Rights had been for the people of the United States. 174 Then, as now,
the U.S. government embraced "basic principles of human rights and
freedoms," applicable to "all peoples of all nations," without wishing
thereby to alter in any way American law or the existing "legal obli17 5
gation" of the United States.
The American commitment to liberty and inalienable human
rights that animated the Revolution, the constitutions (State and
Federal), and the legal systems of the United States has two primary
components: substantive and procedural. The substantive rights of
humanity are enumerated (to the extent that this is possible) in the
State declarations of rights, the U.S. Bill of Rights, and the international covenants and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
procedural commitments to democratic deliberation, to the separation of powers, to legislative and executive checks and balances, and
to an independent judiciary have been much more important in securing the rights and liberty of American citizens. As James Madison
well expressed it in the Federalist,explaining the U.S. Constitution
to the People of New York, "parchment barriers" against despotism
will not be effective without "divided and balanced" institutions, so
that each part of government can effectively "check" and "restrain"
176
the excesses of the others.
The independence of the judiciary has played a particularly important role in the procedural protection of universal human rights in
the United States, since judges have always had the last word in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, including the Fourteenth
77
Amendment guarantees of "liberty" and the "due process of law.'
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution made sure that judges would
172. GLENDON, MARY ANN, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
173. Roosevelt, Eleanor, On the Adoption of the Universal Declarationof Human
Rights, United Nations General Assembly (December 9, 1948).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. "Publius" [James Madison], THE FEDERALIST No. 48 in the NEW YORK PACKET
(February 1, 1788).
177. This judicial authority was famously confirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), when Chief
Justice John Marshall declared for the Court that "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" and reiterated that "the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature."
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serve "during good behavior, 1 7 8 which is to say for life, and that their
salaries "shall not be diminished" during their continuance in office. 179 Americans knew (and know) this to be "the best expedient
a steady, upright,
which can be devised in any government, to8secure
1 0
laws.
the
of
administration
and impartial
Alexander Hamilton, in his Federalistessays in favor of the U.S.
Constitution, praised judicial independence and long judicial terms in
office as an "excellent barrier" against despotism1 8 1 and insisted
(quoting Montesquieu) that "there is no liberty if the power of judging
be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.182 Then,
as now, judges in the United States needed "complete independence"
to exercise properly their power "to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution void."'18 3 The framers of the U.S.
Constitution knew that "without this, all reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.' 8 4 Alexander Hamilton and other architects of the U.S. legal system saw the
independence of judges as absolutely necessary to protect the "rights
of individuals" against "serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community."1 8 5 None of this could be expected "from judges who hold
their offices by a temporary commission.' 8 6
U.S. judges interpreting the U.S. Constitution in U.S. Courts
have been the greatest guardians of fundamental human rights
throughout the history of the United States of America, and they are
unlikely to cede their jurisdiction to international institutions until
the procedural safeguards of liberty in international organizations,
courts and tribunals have reached a considerably higher stage of development. 18 7 American States have ceded ultimate authority over
the universal and inalienable rights of their people to the Federal
government, which establishes a precedent for similar deference to
international courts, but the limited terms in office of judges on most
international tribunals, 8 8 and the participation of illiberal and un178. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Article III, Section I.
179. Id.
180. "Publius" [Alexander Hamilton], FEDERALIST 78 in the INDEPENDENT

JOURNAL

(June 14, 1788).

181. Id.
182. Id., citing CHARLES DR SECONDAT, BARON DE LA BR9DE ET DE MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, volume I, p. 181.
183. "Publius" [Alexander Hamilton], FEDERALIST 78 in the INDEPENDENT JOURNAL
(June 14, 1788).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See the remarks of Chief Justice Roberts in Medellin v. Texas 128 S.Ct. 1346,
1367 (2008).
188. Judges on the International Court of Justice serve for renewable nine-year
terms. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 13(1).
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democratic regimes in the selection of judges, 18 9 makes it unlikely
that any such American move towards global federation will take
place at any time in the near future.
The U.S. Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the fundamental
rights required by liberty and the due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the highest State
courts have similar authority over their own bills and declarations of
rights. But these documents, in both instances, depend ultimately
upon universal and inalienable liberties, which apply to all peoples,
everywhere. American judges and public officials are far more likely
to refer to the substantive views of foreign and international authorities on the requirements of universal human rights than they are to
defer to their procedural authority. Because "liberty" is an absolute
and universal value, guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, American
judges properly can and often do consider international and foreign
perceptions of liberty and fundamental human rights, including
views expressed in documents and tribunals to which the U.S. has
never been a party.
Human rights are universal and binding in U.S. law and U.S.
courts. They are protected by each of the States in their separate bills
and declarations of rights, by the Federal government in the U.S. Bill
of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, and by the law of nations,
which is part of the law of the United States and of the law of each of
the States in the Union. To understand the requirements of liberty
and the fundamental and inalienable rights of humanity, U.S. courts,
and public officials consider all sources that illuminate the requirements of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," including
international conventions and foreign judicial opinions. International
courts and international organizations cannot, as yet, exercise effective jurisdiction, judicial or otherwise, over the law of the United
States, even as it applies to fundamental human rights, but U.S. law
itself incorporates the requirements of universal human rights. "A
decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has always illuminated
American understandings of the rights of Americans. 190 The law of
the United States seeks to secure the "Blessings of Liberty" for all its
subjects.' 9 '

189. Judges on the International Court of Justice are elected by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations, id., Article 4(1).
190.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1776).
191.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(1787), Preamble.

(July 4,
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